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ABSTRACT
Sovereign bond contracts create unique legal problems for bondholders, issuers,
and courts. Specifically, when a sovereign becomes insolvent, there is no international
workout mechanism through which the sovereign’s debt can be efficiently restructured.
Absent a mechanism similar to bankruptcy for sovereigns, some bondholders may
attempt to resist restructuring in an effort to obtain a legal judgment for the full value of
their initial investment. Until recently, the legal status and rights of these holdout
creditors has been uncertain. However, a recent Second Circuit decision upheld creditors’
rights to hold out or resist a sovereign’s attempt to restructure its debt. Of course, this
decision creates a host of other problems related to collective action and efficiency.
International legal scholars remain uncertain whether such judgments are enforceable
against a sovereign. The Supreme Court of the United States has accepted a petition for
certiorari regarding enforceability issues and is considering a petition for the underlying
question of holdout creditors’ rights.
This paper highlights the complexities and complications that have brought
sovereign debt to the forefront of international legal scholarship. Although scholars and
politicians have proposed solutions to the sovereign debt dilemma, the paper argues that
none of the proposed solutions provides an adequate remedy to the problem. Using an
original economic model, the paper argues that an Argentinian default (repudiation) is the
socially optimal response to the NML Capital decision and will lend the most stability to
the sovereign debt market. However, as a repeat player in the international bond market,
Argentina has an individual incentive to comply with the Second Circuit’s order and pay
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the holdout creditors. Finally, the paper considers how the Supreme Court may provide a
more realistic avenue to alter the adverse incentives that the Second Circuit’s decision
created.
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INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the issue of securities has provided a mechanism for borrowers and
debtors to obtain capital quickly for immediate use. This mechanism has proven equally
beneficial for lenders and creditors, by affording them an opportunity to lend capital now
for repayment at a premium (or with accrued interest) in the future. However, this system
is not without risks. As long as debtors and creditors have existed, civil society has
recognized that sometimes debtors fail to pay their debts1 and has created policies to
govern the creditor-debtor relationship.2 Most importantly, institutions and mechanisms
have evolved in order to protect creditors from borrowers who fail to pay their debts or
default. Interest rates, the use of collateral, bankruptcy regimes, and even criminal
proceedings have evolved in the interest of creditor protection to ensure that lenders are
afforded safeguards ex ante and judicial recourse ex post. However, when the borrower is
a sovereign state, courts and creditors alike face a host of obstacles that make traditional
safeguards impracticable.
Using the current conflict between NML Capital and the Republic of Argentina as
a case study3, this paper will first analyze the specific problems that sovereign debt
presents for both creditors and courts. Second, it will argue that given the current legal
state of sovereign debt and the absence of an appropriate solution, a particular outcome to
the NML Capital case is socially optimal. Part I will provide an overview of the facts of
NML Capital v. Argentina. Part II will use the case’s particular facts and the arguments
made by each party to illustrate the legal challenges and complexities of enforcing

1

Psalm 37:21-22 “The wicked borrow and do not repay, but the righteous give generously.”
Deuteronomy 15:1-2 instructed that outstanding debts should be expunged from the creditor’s books every
seven years.
3
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012).
2
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sovereign debt agreements. After recognizing the obstacles that sovereign debt presents,
Part III will provide a framework for analyzing external solutions and judicial outcomes.
Part IV will explore various solutions to these obstacles that have been employed by
international business transaction lawyers or proposed by supranational organizations.
After concluding that none of the current proposals or remedies effectively mitigate the
problems outlined in Part II, Part V will return to the conflict between NML Capital and
Argentina. This section offers an economic model for analyzing the a lender’s decision to
restructure or holdout. This model will help evaluate the externalities of the judicial
decision, as well as the subsequent action by the parties involved. Particularly, this
section will identify the socially optimal response to the Second Circuit decision, but it
will also explain why Argentina’s individual incentives render the country unlikely to
respond in the socially optimal way. Finally, Part VI will analyze the decisions before the
United States Supreme Court and offer suggestions for how the nation’s highest court can
correct the adverse incentives created by the Second Circuit’s decision.
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PART I: A CASE STUDY: NML CAPITAL LTD. V. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA
A. Background Facts
In the 1990s, investors from the “developed world” began investing heavily in
“emerging markets” like Argentina. Between 1992 and 1994, foreign direct investment
into Argentina averaged $3.6 Billion US Dollars annually.4 At the time, Latin American
and South America were widely thought to be the next big area for economic growth, so
prospects for investors seemed promising.5 Looking to capitalize on widely available
foreign and domestic investment, Argentina began issuing securities pursuant to a Fiscal
Agency Agreement (“FAA”) in 1994.6 This bond issuance offered investors coupon rates
ranging from 9.75% to 15.5%, with maturities ranging from April of 2005 to September
2031.7 Notably, the FAA contained a “pari passu” clause, which stated that securities
issued pursuant to that agreement should “at all times rank pari passu without any
preference among themselves.”8 The clause further stated “the payment obligations of the
Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other
present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness…”9 This second
portion is often referred to as the “Equal Treatment Provision” in the court opinions and
briefs. The pari passu clause generally, and the Equal Treatment Provision specifically
are important, as they contain critical, yet vague language whose intent and meaning
became the focal point of the litigation between the parties.

4

Robert Bouzas & Daniel Chudnovsky, Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development: The
Recent Argentine Experience (May 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (On file with Universidad de San
Andres), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_country_report_argentina.pdf.
5
Patrick J. Regan, South of the Border: Investors Discover Latin America, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL,
Vol. 48, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1992), at 9-12.
6
NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2012).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
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The boom of the early 1990s was quickly followed by a sharp decline for the
Argentine economy. Argentina entered a recession in 1998 and concerns about the
country’s massive external debt soon followed.10 Political and economic turmoil came to
a head in December of 2001 when unemployment reached nearly 20%, decimating
Argentina’s tax revenues and sparking domestic outcry against Argentine government
policies.11 It seemed almost certain that Argentina would default on the $132 Billion US
dollars in foreign debt that it accumulated through the 1980s and 1990s, including the
FAA bonds. Argentina implemented austerity measures that included severe cuts to
government salaries and spending, reduction of government pensions, and even
conversion of private pension funds to Argentine treasury bills in order to service
Argentina’s massive foreign debt accumulation.12 The country also restricted withdrawal
of bank deposits to counter the run on domestic banks. However, austerity measures
failed to comply with requirements set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
the bank discontinued its support system for the South American country.13 While the
austerity measures were insufficient to gain the support of the international community,
their severity triggered riots by Argentine nationals, resulting in 20 deaths and a series of
crucial political resignations.14
Following the widespread rioting and the resignation of President Fernando de la
Rua, Argentina’s Assembly nominated Adolfo Rodríguez Saa to serve as interim

10

International Monetary Fund, The Role of the IMF in Argentina, 1991-2002, Issues Paper/ Terms of
Reference for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). July 2003.
11
The Events that Triggered Argentina’s Crisis, BBC News (Dec. 21, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1721103.stm.
12
Id.
13
International Monetary Fund, supra note 10.
14
BBC, supra note 11.
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president.15 On the second day of his eight-day tenure in office, Saa went before the
Argentine Assembly and declared a temporary moratorium on principal and interest
payments on more than $80 billion of Argentina’s public external debt, including the
FAA Bonds.16 Each year since 2001, Argentina renewed the moratorium and has refused
to pay the external debt.17
In 2005, Argentina began to restructure its outstanding debt by issuing an
exchange offer to its creditors. This exchange offer created new, unsecured and
unsubordinated debt for which holders of old FAA bonds could exchange their current
securities at a rate of 25 to 29 cents on the dollar.18 By accepting the new bonds, the
creditors agreed to forgo remedies and rights afforded by the original FAA agreement.
The Exchange Offer explicitly warned creditors that their FAA bonds would likely
remain in default indefinitely and that failure to tender FAA bonds would likely result in
forfeiture of any payment pursuant to the original agreement.19 Essentially, the Exchange
offer gave creditors an ultimatum: either agree to the terms of the restructuring or face the
likelihood of nonpayment on Argentina’s prior obligations.
To strengthen the threat, Argentina’s legislature passed a “Lock Law” prohibiting
the Executive branch from making new exchange offers or settling on the FAA bonds in
or out of court.20 The Lock Law also required that the FAA bonds be removed from
foreign securities markets and exchanges. After the exchange offer closed in June of

15

Id.
Pamela Druckerman, Argentina Hasn’t Exempted IMF From Moratorium on Paying Debts, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 4, 2002, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB101009064044793320.html.
17
See NML Capital Ltd., 699 F.3d at 251.
18
Id at 252.
19
Id.
20
Id.
16
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2005, 76% of the outstanding FAA bonds had been exchanged pursuant to the
restructuring.21
Argentina suspended the Lock Law in 2010 in an attempt to exchange the
remaining 24% of FAA bonds for the restructured bonds.22 The terms of the second
restructuring were virtually identical, including a warning that outstanding FAA
securities may remain in default indefinitely. After the second exchange offer, less than
9% of the 1994 FAA bonds remained outstanding.23 Until the time of an injunction by the
Second Circuit in February of 2012, Argentina paid all of its debt obligations to the
restructured bondholders, but did not make payments to the remaining FAA bonds
(hereinafter referred to as “holdouts”).
Between 2009 and 2011, the plaintiffs in NML Capital v. Argentina filed suits for
injunctive relief pursuant to the pari passu clause and Equal Treatment Provision within
the FAA. The plaintiffs sought to enforce the Equal Treatment Provision by suspending
payments to bonds issued pursuant to the 2005 and 2010 Exchange Offers, without also
making payments on the earlier FAA debt. The plaintiffs (holdouts) argued that making
payments to the restructured debt while not also making payments to the earlier debt
violates the Equal Treatment Provision, which states that the FAA debt “shall at all times
rank at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated
external indebtedness.” By failing to make payments to its earlier debt obligations, the
holdouts argued that Argentina failed to meet its contractual obligations and subordinated
the FAA debt.
B. Issues and Arguments
21

Id at 253.
Id.
23
Id.
22
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1. Meaning of the pari passu clause and equal treatment provision
In response to the plaintiff’s allegations, Argentina made the same substantive
claim twice, first in the Southern District of New York before Judge Thomas Griesa, and
a second time before the United States District Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
before Judge Barrington Parker. Argentina’s argument was that the clause against
subordination referred only to formal, legal subordination. Subordination, they argued,
only occurred when a sovereign created discriminatory legal rankings and gave certain
legal priorities to other classes of debt.24 Applying this interpretation, Argentina argued
that it did not subordinate the FAA debt by making payments to the Exchange Offer debt,
because the sovereign did not alter the “legal ranking” of the two relative to each other.25
The plaintiffs’ argument was based on an alternate interpretation of the clause.
Subordination, they argued, referred to both legal and de facto subordination.26 By this
standard, Argentina’s decision to make payments to the restructured debt and not to the
FAA debt did constitute subordination, as it provided benefits (payments) to one class of
debt that it did not provide to another. 27
Judge Thomas Griesa of the United States District Court of the Southern District
of New York agreed with the plaintiffs, holding Argentina’s de facto subordination
violated the pari passu clause in the FAA.28 Upon appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed
that holding.29 Judge Parker held that while the plaintiffs’ more liberal interpretation of
the pari passu clause was the correct interpretation, Argentina would be found in

24

Id at 256-257.
Id.
26
Id at 258.
27
Id.
28
Id at 256
29
Id at 265.
25
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violation by either standard.30 Even under the more stringent “legal subordination”
standard, Argentina would still be in default.31 By enacted legislation prohibiting
payments pursuant to the FAA, the sovereign created a legal designation between classes
of debt, one of which was denied payment through legislative action. 32
2. Remedy
Notwithstanding the factual dispute as to whether Argentina subordinated the
FAA debt, Argentina’s second argument attacked the remedy awarded by the Southern
District of New York. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ request and required
Argentina specific performance on the contract.33 In the context of this case, that specific
performance took the form of an injunction and enforcement of the pari passu clause.
The injunction prohibited Argentina from making payments to the exchange offer debt
without also making payments to the FAA debt.34 However, Argentina argued that
specific performance violated the terms agreed upon in the FAA because the agreement
contained an acceleration clause. The acceleration clause provided that in the event of
default, Argentina should pay damages to its creditors equal to the full amount it owed. 35
While it may seem counterintuitive that Argentina would argue for enforcement of the
acceleration clause, which would require substantial payment to the holdouts, Argentina
knew such a remedy would be unenforceable against a sovereign.

30

Id at 260.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id at 255-256. Note that in this context, specific performance did not mean that Argentina was required to
make payments. The court awarded specific performance with respect to the equal treatment provision, and
enjoined payment to the restructured debt without also paying the holdouts.
34
Note: the formula for calculating how payments should be made (pro rata, full, equal quantity) was
remanded and is the subject of the current appeal. If upheld, the Southern District of New York’s decision
would require Argentina to make a “ratable payment” to the holdouts and would enjoin third parties from
executing payments to holders of restructured debt.
35
NML Capital Ltd., 699 F.3d at 251.
31
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On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s award of injunctive
relief and specific performance.36 The court noted that although the FAA did contain an
acceleration clause, New York law allowed the court to award other forms of relief when
equitable and necessary and when not explicitly prohibited by the contract. 37
While the contract clearly did not contain a prohibition against specific
performance, the court of appeals did have to address the issue of whether specific
performance was equitable and necessary. On this point, the Second Circuit reviewed the
district court’s ruling and applied a “clear abuse of discretion” standard.38 To address the
question of necessity, the court observed that through the Lock Law, Argentina made
clear its intention not to comply with legal decisions that provide monetary relief to
holders of FAA debt. Because of its status as a sovereign, Argentina could follow
through with that intention. Thus, the court held that an alternate remedy was necessary
for the plaintiffs.39 When assessing the equity of such a decision, the court used a balance
of equities approach. Again, the court noted that because of its status as a sovereign
nation, Argentina would be able to violate its contractual obligations with impunity
because a US Court could not force the Argentine government to make a payment.40
Because a monetary award was unavailable, the appellate court held that lower courts
should afford relief to plaintiffs through other judicial avenues that they could enforce
and would serve the court’s equitable purpose.41

36

Id at 265.
Id at 261, citing Guiness Harp Corp v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1980). See
also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (noting that “the balance of equities and
consideration of the public interest are pertinent in assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief,
preliminary or permanent.”).
38
Id at 257.
39
Id at 262.
40
Id at 263.
41
Id at 262.
37
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However, on appeal, Argentina argued that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) barred US courts from requiring the country to pay plaintiffs with immune
property located outside the US.42 Section 1609 of the FSIA states that “the property in
the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment and arrest and
execution.”43 Likewise, the appellate opinion notes that courts are barred from granting
“by injunction, relief which they may not provide by attachment.”44 In response, Judge
Barrington asserted that the injunction would not violate section 1609 of the FSIA,
because none of Argentina’s property would be “attached, arrested, or executed.” Rather,
the injunction works through third parties such as intermediary banks to prohibit payment
from traveling from Argentina to holders of the exchange offer debt. 45 Thus, none of
Argentina’s property was affected by the decision.46 Yet, the injunction had the effect of
prohibiting Argentine funds from moving to exchange offer creditors if Argentina did not
also make payments to FAA debt.

42

Id at 257.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1609 (West 2013).
44
Id.
45
NML Capital Ltd., 699 F.3d at 263. Note: How third parties and intermediaries would be affected by the
injunction was a topic to be clarified upon remand to the Southern District of New York.
46
Id.
43
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PART II: THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SOVEREIGN DEBT
The arguments Argentina made in response to the holdout creditor’s allegations
are illustrative of the general problems associated with sovereign debt. The first set of
problems address the ability of creditors to bring claims against debtors because of their
status as sovereign entities.
A. Immunity under the Act of State Doctrine or Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA)
Disputes against sovereigns are generally subject to two important principles of
American and International law: the Act of State Doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA).
The Act of State Doctrine generally holds that US courts should not pass
judgment on the actions of a sovereign state acting through its governmental bodies. As
stated in Underhill v. Hernandez,
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of
by sovereign powers as between themselves.47
It seems logical that a state’s financial decisions, such as whether to issue bonds and
whether to default on said bonds, would fall within the protection of the act of state
doctrine. If so, sovereign bondholders would be left helpless in the event of sovereign
default, even if the circumstances that led to the default were completely within the
control of the sovereign.
While the Act of State doctrine has significant implications for sovereign
immunity and international law generally, the reasoning behind the doctrine is actually
47

Underhill v. Hernandz, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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grounded in the concept of separation of powers.48 Recognizing that the doctrine’s
purpose is to safeguard the powers of the executive branch from judicial encroachment in
matters of foreign affairs, it is not surprising that the doctrine is not a major concern with
respect to sovereign debt. The judicial branch will only apply the Act of State Doctrine to
matters affecting foreign affairs, as those are enumerated powers of the executive branch.
However, sovereign debt disputes are contractual in nature, not foreign affairs. Therefore,
the Act of State Doctrine will rarely be used to afford the executive exclusive control
over sovereign debt disputes, as sovereign debt is not wholly within the realm of foreign
affairs. Thus, sovereign debt disputes avoid being barred from judicial action by the Act
of State Doctrine.
A much more relevant concern is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
Codified in 28 U.S.C.A. §1604, the FSIA grants foreign states judicial immunity from
proceedings in the courts of the United States.49 However, this immunity is subject to
certain exceptions, including an exception for a sovereign acting with a commercial
purpose.50 In a case unrelated to the NML Capital dispute, the Supreme Court in held that
an earlier Argentine default on sovereign bonds did fall within the commercial activities

48

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (“The text of the Constitution does not
require the act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the
validity of foreign acts of state. The act of state doctrine does, however, have ‘constitutional’
underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of
separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement
particular kinds of decisions in the area of international relations. The doctrine as formulated in past
decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself
and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.”)
49
28 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (West 2013).
50
28 U.S.C.A. § 1604(a)(2) (West 2013) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case… in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes
a direct effect in the United States.”).
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exception.51 Further, because the default occurred within the sovereign’s territory (and
thus outside the US courts’ jurisdiction), the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the
default also had a “direct effect” in the United States. The court liberally construed the
direct effect requirement and held that because the place of payment was New York, the
Argentine default had a direct effect in the United States.52
However, if a sovereign wished to avoid the reach of US courts, it would not be
difficult to do so. By making the payments to intermediaries outside of the United States,
a sovereign default would still fall within a commercial exception, but would fail the
requisite direct effects test. Indeed, making payments to intermediaries is a very common
practice in the sovereign debt market. However, few sovereign debtors choose this shield
from US courts. In fact, most do not attempt to escape US judicial reach at all and
explicitly accept US or foreign jurisdiction.
Rather than avoid foreign judicial reach, most sovereign debtors take a different
approach entirely and waive their right to immunity under the FSIA.53 Ex ante, this
waiver sends a message to potential creditors that the sovereign intends to stand
accountable for its debt and is willing to submit to the American judicial system for
adjudication in the event of default. With this kind of assurance in place, creditors are
willing to lend to the sovereign at a lower interest rate because they perceive the risk to
be mitigated by the ability to seek judicial recourse.

51

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
Id. at 618-619.
53
Panizza et. al., The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
LITERATURE, Vol. 47, No. 3, (Sept., 2009) (“… such waivers are in fact routinely included in bond
covenants. As a result, under U.S. law (and that of several other major jurisdictions), sovereign immunity
no longer plays an important role in shielding sovereign debtors from creditor suits.”)
52
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Thus, two doctrines that would prevent creditors from bringing suits against
defaulting sovereign debtors are rendered virtually irrelevant in modern debt
conveyances. However, the FSIA presents a more substantial challenge in the context of
enforcing and awarding judicial remedies.
B. Attachment/ Enforcement of Judicial Awards
While it is common to for a sovereign to waive its right to judicial immunity under
§1604, the FSIA provides other protections to sovereigns against enforcement of US
judicial decisions. Because courts cannot enforce judicial awards over assets that are not
subject to the court’s jurisdiction, sovereign assets located outside of the US are generally
unavailable for adjudicatory remedies. Moreover, the FSIA even shields sovereign assets
located within the United States from “attachment, arrest, and execution.”54 Although
debt instruments typically waive the sovereign’s judicial immunity, a waiver of judicial
immunity under §1604 does not imply a waiver of asset protection under §1609.55
However, just as the general provision for judicial immunity contains a commercial
activities exception56, so too does the protection against attachment.57 Sovereign assets
used for commercial activities are excluded from the FSIA’s asset protection under
§1610.58 Stated differently, a sovereign’s assets being used for governmental functions

54

28 U.S.C.A. § 1609.
Walters v. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F. 3d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 2011) (“…the
FSIA's provisions governing jurisdictional immunity, on the one hand, and execution immunity, on the
other, operate independently. As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
explains, this means that “a waiver of immunity from suit does not imply a waiver of immunity from
attachment of property, and a waiver of immunity from attachment of property does not imply a waiver of
immunity from suit.”).
56
28 U.S.C.A. § 1604.
57
28 U.S.C.A. § 1610.
58
28 U.S.C.A § 1610 (West 2013) (“The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in
section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from
judicial attachment in aid of execution…”).
55
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are immune from attachment, but if a sovereign is acting in its capacity as a commercial
actor, assets used for such purposes are not afforded FSIA protection.
In the zenith of state-supported industry, a court may have found it easy to
identify sovereign assets being used for commercial purchases. However, industries have
become increasingly private in recent decades. Sovereigns have relatively few
commercial assets, and even fewer assets located within the jurisdiction of US courts.
The FSIA’s exemption for attachment thus creates a difficult dilemma in which courts
can adjudicate against a sovereign but are unable to award a monetary judgment for
damages. Thus, courts have had to work around this problem by issuing different forms
of remedies that often implicate and adversely affect third parties.
C. Third Party Interests
This predicament described above is one-reason third parties often become key
players and parties of interest in sovereign debt disputes. For example, in the NML
Capital case against Argentina, the court was unable to award monetary damages to the
holdout creditors. Instead, it was forced to issue an injunction prohibiting Argentina from
performing on other contracts (the Exchange Offer bonds) without also performing on the
FAA bonds. This implication for third parties is obviously less desirable, as it adversely
affects other economic actors who would otherwise be unaffected by a holdout dispute
between a sovereign and its creditors. Thus, the FSIA protects sovereign assets but at the
expense of third parties.
This will likely be a problem in all sovereign debt disputes. Courts would like to
penalize a sovereign who breaches a contractual obligation. The ability to do so would
properly align the interests of the sovereign and creditors. However, the FSIA prohibits

15

courts from enforcing this remedy. Rather, courts are forced to issue injunctions and
alternative remedies whose effect is most harmful to third parties, such as other creditors
and financial intermediaries. In this respect, Argentina’s default is illustrative. Some of
the parties most concerned with the litigation and the Second Circuit’s opinion are parties
not directly involved with the litigation. Financial intermediaries like New York Mellon
Corp, the indenture trustee for the restructured bonds, submitted amicus briefs throughout
the NML Capital litigation. One of the issues on remand, and now before the Second
Circuit, is how a ruling in favor of the holdout creditors can be enforced against third
parties.
D. General Collective Action Problems
When a sovereign becomes unable to meet its debt obligations, it typically will
attempt to restructure its debt to extend the period over which payments are made or
lower the premiums paid. However, at the first sign of insolvency, each creditor has an
individual incentive to renegotiate the terms of his or her holdings to get the most
favorable terms at the expense of his counterparties. Each individual creditor has an
incentive structure that is divergent from the best interest of the entire class of debt. This
is the classic collective action problem. To mitigate this problem, sovereigns will
typically offer a uniform exchange, as Argentina did in 2005 and 2010.
When one examines this collective action problem in the context of sovereign
debt restructuring, it becomes evident why the decision in NML Capital v. Argentina is so
significant. If courts recognize the rights of holdouts to enforce the original terms of the
debt issue, they create a significant incentive for creditors to decline debt restructurings in
order to enforce the more favorable terms of the initial offering. On the other hand, if
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courts refuse to enforce the original terms of the debt, they will give sovereigns the right
to unilaterally force modified terms on their creditors. Stated differently, courts would
prohibit creditors and sovereign debtors from “bargaining in the shadow of the law,”
because the sovereign knows that the law will not force them to abide by the initial terms
of their contracts.
E. Pari Passu
The primary question concerned in the NML Capital litigation was over the
interpretation of the pari passu clause, and the meaning of the Equal Treatment
Provision. However, before discussing the interpretation or meaning of these provisions,
it is appropriate to understand where they came from and why they are present in
sovereign debt contracts.
When a private (non-sovereign) actor issues bonds or another form of debt, that
issuer presents potential investors with a decision in risk allocation. There is a chance that
the issuer will default on its promise to pay the bonds later. In the corporate context, there
is a possibility that the value of the firm’s debt obligations will surpass the value of its
current assets or assets it can generate in the foreseeable future. When a corporation or
firm finds itself in this situation, the borrower and its assets can be liquidated through
bankruptcy. At liquidation, its assets are converted into cash, and that cash is distributed
to creditors. However, lenders have long recognized that the priority for cash
disbursements in liquidation is important. Thus, the pari passu clause evolved as a
mechanism to ensure that, in the event of liquidation, creditors are treated equally and are
paid on a pro rata basis. This is especially important when the corporation has the ability
to issue new debt with different contractual terms. The pari passu clause ensured that no
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new debt would be given priority over more senior debt, and vice versa, between the
borrower and other creditors.
However, a sovereign state cannot be liquidated. In essence, sovereigns are
protected as “permanent going concerns.” This presents an important question: if a
sovereign is not subject to liquidation, what is the purpose of the pari passu clause in
sovereign debt contracts?59 If there is never a possibility that the assets of a sovereign
will be liquidated, what protections, if any, does the clause provide investors or debtors in
the sovereign debt context? These questions are garnering substantial attention in today’s
economic literature. But the precise legal meaning of pari passu is outside of this paper’s
scope. It is the manner in which these clauses are enforced and the economic
ramifications of their enforcement that is most relevant for this paper’s consideration.
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PART III: FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING A SOVEREIGN DEBT SOLUTION OR SYSTEM
The preceding section outlined the problems and challenges that sovereign debt
presents and the following section will analyze legal and political responses that may
mitigate the problems. However, before proceeding to that analysis, it is necessary to
articulate the socially desirable goals and features that any remedy or system should
encompass. These aims should serve as a metric for assessing the feasibility,
effectiveness, and desirability of any changes to the sovereign debt system.
From an efficiency and societal wealth-maximizing perspective, any system or
solution affecting sovereign debt should have a few main objectives. Choi, Gulati, and
Posner provide a helpful structure through which to frame the analysis.60 First, they note
that sovereigns always exist in one of two states.61 The first, they call the “good state,”
characterized by economic health and the ability to pay debts.62 On the other hand, the
“bad state,” results from external or internal economic hardships and results in the
sovereign’s inability to pay its debts.63 As the authors note, one primary difficulty with
sovereign debt contracts is the difficulty for investors to distinguish between sovereigns
in good states and sovereigns in bad state. They assert that sovereign debt contracts have
several goals, many of which are also applicable for a resolution of the sovereign debt
problem outlined above. The authors note that these goals should be to
Encouraging sovereigns to repay in the good state; enabling value-increasing
restructurings in bad states; preventing debtors from seeking to exploit divisions
among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce their debt burden; and

60

Stephen J. Choi, et al., The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
131, 132 (2012).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.

19

preventing debtors from taking risks in order to externalize the cost of default on
creditors. 64
Like sovereign debt contracts generally, any resolution to the sovereign debt dilemma
should also seek to achieve the goals mentioned by Choi, Gulati, and Posner. Namely,
such a system should encourage restructuring in “bad states” so that each creditor can
recover as much of their original investment as possible.
However, it should be clear that restructuring is not always a socially optimal
solution. Indeed, holdouts should and do serve an important purpose in the context of
sovereign debt restructuring. Without a system of rights and obligations owed to holdout
creditors, sovereigns would have no incentive to negotiate in good faith with their
creditors. Likewise, sovereigns in the “good state” may find it easy to behave
opportunistically and force a restructuring when it is not absolutely necessary in order to
eliminate their burden to meet its debt obligations. 65 In this respect, holdout rights serve
as the backbone to good faith negotiation. This is often referred to as negotiating “in the
shadow of the law.”
To summarize, any external mechanism or judicially created solution to the
sovereign debt problem should create the incentive for creditors to undertake good-faith
restructuring negotiations with a sovereign who cannot meet its obligations (i.e., is in a
“bad state”) and should deter such restructuring when a sovereign is financially healthy.
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PART IV: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE SOVEREIGN DEBT DILEMMA
The problems outlined in Part II present a number of questions and very few
answers. How, if at all, will the dilemma of sovereign debt be resolved? Does the solution
to the problems outlined above lie within the reach of the US Judiciary? Could an
external institution, such as the International Monetary Fund provide a mechanism or
solution to remedy the problems with the sovereign debt market? Should creditors and
debtors create new and innovative contractual provisions to govern future contracts?
Likewise, are there mechanisms utilized in other areas of law amenable to sovereign debt
contracts? Should actors within the sovereign debt market look outside the law
completely and rely on a traditional interest rate regime to monitor sovereign debt
transactions? This section will present and evaluate some of these ideas and questions.
A. Allow Interest Rates to Regulate
One may wonder why any external action, judicial or otherwise, is necessary to
regulate sovereign bonds at all. After all, one of the first lessons in any economics course
is the trade-off between risk and reward. Investors require a higher return or premium on
investments that they perceive to be more risky. Therefore, government bonds, which
have traditionally been thought to be the most secure and “safe” of all investments,
typically carry a very low rate of interest. However, investors with the same risk
preferences will demand a substantially higher return for equity investments in the stock
of publicly traded corporations, because these investments are thought to be riskier than
government bonds. Some may reasonably argue that this basic economic principle should
be sufficient to govern the sovereign debt market. Stated succinctly, the complete risk
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associated with any security should be adequately reflected by the premium or interest
rate the particular security offers an investor.
If a security’s return were sufficient to regulate the sovereign debt market, bonds
of countries with a high risk of default would offer a substantially higher market premia
than those from more secure countries. Additionally, markets would be quick to adjust to
new market information. When a country’s economic outlook became less certain, its
bonds would exchange for discounts on secondary markets and new bond issues would
have to offer greater interest rates to lenders. In this way, investors could choose
investments that meet their risk preferences. Sovereign bonds with a high risk of default
would be rated like “junk bonds,” but would offer risk-taking investors substantial
premia. In theory, this premium over more secure bonds would fully encompass the
added risk of default. Rather than seeking judicial awards, investors would simply incur
the loss associated with their risky investment as they do when they buy equity
investments.
However, bond markets do not operate so efficiently. It seems as though the
sovereign debt market operates with significant market distortions and informational
asymmetries. Sovereign debt offers judicial recourse (the effectiveness of this recourse is
debatable) making the interest rates and similar measures of return in sovereign debt
contracts much less effective than in equity investments. Further, the risk of a sovereign
debt investment is often unknown ex ante. Stated differently, it is often the case that a
sovereign must default before an investor is fully aware of the risk associated with the
sovereign. This is supported by research that shows that bond spreads increase after
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default shocks, not leading up to them.66 Further, the information about an investment in
a sovereign bond is skewed by the possibility of a third-party insurer, such as the IMF or
in the case of Europe, a monetary union.67 This information asymmetry undermines the
effectiveness of bond markets as information forcing mechanisms. Further, research has
shown that sovereign bond interest rates are often tied more to the business cycle and
worldwide macroeconomic factors than the specific risk associated with the sovereign
issuing the bonds.68 Thus, as is often the case in economic questions, if more information
could be reflected in the market ex ante, interest rates may have a higher likelihood of
providing an adequate policing mechanism for sovereign debt. However, macroeconomic
uncertainty and the unique legal status of sovereign bonds make interest rates alone
insufficient to regulate the market for sovereign debt.
B. Create a new “International Financial Architecture” or “Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism” (SDRM)
Perhaps the most controversial solution to the sovereign debt problem has been a
proposal by Anne Krueger of the International Monetary Fund. Recognizing that
domestic bankruptcy courts provided a convenient an effective tool to solve the collective
action problem for private, domestic workouts, the IMF proposed a similar system for
sovereign states in 2001.69 Rather than outline a detailed proposal for how a system
would operate, Krueger made a generalized assessment regarding the problems with
sovereign debt, such as the collective action problem and the danger of opportunistic
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holdouts.70 Krueger suggested that the IMF could lend its strong institutional support for
countries struggling to effectively restructure their debt obligations. Moreover, she noted
that the IMF already undertakes substantial monitoring efforts when countries are within
the IMF’s assistance program and are in danger of default.71 These monitoring efforts are
necessary to ensure a defaulting sovereign does not engage in opportunistic fiscal policy.
The IMF’s unique position would allow the institution to alleviate the burden on
individual creditors to monitor a defaulting sovereign’s actions. Krueger’s proposal
outlined four key goals of a future sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM): (1)
preventing holdout creditors from disrupting good-faith negotiations, (2) providing
creditors with a guarantee that the debtor country will act responsibly during the “stand
still” period, (3) providing financial support and guarantees to private lenders who will
need additional incentive to cooperate with and make loans to a defaulting sovereign, and
(4) binding minority creditors to a restructuring agreement once it has been agreed to by a
large enough majority.72 Likewise, Krueger hoped that such a system would rarely be
utilized, but would rather provide a predictable and well-developed operation, such that
debtors and investors would be able to reach a mutually beneficial solution by negotiating
“in the shadow of the law,” not in court.73 Some believe that a SDRM would afford
creditors more rights and bridge the disparity in bargaining leverage between sovereigns
and their lenders.74
While some have been quick to defend Krueger’s SDRM proposal, others have
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argued that the implementation of such a program faces too many challenges and has too
many inherent flaws to be practicable.75 As a primary concern, many have noted that
sovereigns are unwilling to cede control over a workout process to any third party and
will continue to refuse to relinquish complete autonomy absent a better incentive to do
so.76 Others alleged that an IMF controlled system would limit the bargaining power of
creditors and would be an “efficient medium through which the geopolitical wishes of the
G-7 governments could be imposed on private sector lenders.”77 However, such leverage
affects both sides of the creditor-debtor equation, as the ability to impose an economic
standstill upon a sovereign would give the IMF substantial leverage over creditors, but
also significant power over the autonomy of sovereigns.78 Critics like Celeste Boeri have
found problems with the IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) even
more numerous:
There are three main problems with the IMF's statutory approach. First, it could
potentially be applied retroactively to debt already incurred under different terms.
Second, the costs of administration and enforcement may exceed the benefits.
Third, it generates confusion over the IMF's role in the world order as a lender of
last resort, not a sovereign debt manager.79
Finally, some have pointed to the recent “successes” of cases like Argentina, to illustrate
that “borrowers and lenders can work out bond defaults on their own.”80 However, the
description of sovereign debt problems above and the ongoing struggle between
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Argentina and its creditors render this characterization as a “success” quite questionable.
Even Krueger’s general proposal highlighted a fair number of questions such a system
would present, such as the legal basis for such a mechanism and how the IMF would be
able to enforce the policies set forth through any plan. 81
Recently, the emergence of the Collective Action Clause (discussed below) has
eclipsed continued efforts towards a SDRM. Particularly, United States’ recent aversion
to such an effort has led many to conclude that the SDRM proposition is completely off
of the table:
The IMF’s SDRM received a substantial blow during the fund’s spring meeting of
2003. During this meeting, Treasury secretary John Snow cited markets moves
toward collective action clauses and concluded that it was “neither necessary nor
feasible to continue working on SDRM.” In fact, this pronouncement by Secretary
Snow has caused at least one source to declare that the SDRM is “officially dead.”82
C. Escrow and Neutral Third Parties
The use of escrows is an investment protection technique that has proven useful in
dealing with sovereign counterparties in the context of joint ventures. This tool is
premised on the idea that a sovereign cannot expropriate funds that are automatically held
outside of its borders in foreign bank accounts. Thus, by channeling funds directly to a
foreign third-party, investors in a foreign joint venture agreement can minimize the
political risk associated with conducting business with a sovereign. Because sovereign
debt agreements also contain political risk, this mechanism may be an effective tool to
utilize in sovereign debt contracts. However, this contractual tool has not been tested or
analyzed in the academic literature.
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In the context of sovereign bonds, the funds that are in danger of unjust
expropriation are internal tax revenues owed to creditors under the terms of sovereign
bond contracts. In theory, the terms of a bond offering could specify that the requisite tax
revenues to meet a country’s debt obligations could be directly deposited into a thirdparty escrow immediately after collection. If effective, this would eliminate the
possibility that a sovereign could reallocate the revenues to internal projects or make
preferential payments to its domestic debt holders. In theory, the escrow would
undertake those responsibilities and allocation decisions.83
However, the problems that are concerns for sovereign debt are not completely
eliminated by the use of escrows and third parties. Tax revenues collected by the national
treasury could easily be expropriated prior to being channeled to the escrow. While this
would violate the terms of the bond contract, this seems of little consequence from the
perspective of a sovereign. Often the actions that lead to a sovereign default are also
against the terms of its bond contracts, but internal considerations often outweigh
obligations to debtors, causing the countries to willfully breach. However, contrary to a
domestic contract breach where both parties are subject to the same jurisdiction,
contractual breaches in the sovereign context provide limited opportunities for creditor
recourse. Furthermore, just as there is a concern about yielding control of a sovereign’s
affairs in the context of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, it seems probable
that these same concerns would be raised if a country were asked to submit its tax
revenue decisions to a neutral third-party. Since bond terms are authored by issuing
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countries, it is even less likely that a sovereign would willfully cede control over tax
revenues by offering this type of arrangement.
D. Syndication and Third Party Guarantees
Another possible means by which creditors could be afforded protection in the
context of sovereign debt is through syndication or third-party guarantees. Under this
process, third parties such as the IMF or another sovereign could act as an insurer of an
issuing country’s sovereign debt. Such an arrangement would have the effect of lowering
the interest rate demanded by investors and increasing the security of their loan. In the
event of default, another party would be tied to the investment, providing an alternate
source for investment recovery.
To some extent, a process like this already exists in practice. The IMF often
provides financial assistance to struggling sovereigns in order to help avoid default.84 The
IMF is able to make temporary, interest free loans to countries in financial distress and
can also lend needed liquidity through “Stand-By Arrangements,” in which the IMF acts
as the guarantor of loans made to the distressed country. In exchange for such support,
the IMF imposes certain market-based regulations on the distressed sovereign. In this
way, the IMF acts similarly to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to
regulate and stabilize investments, but on an international scale. However, the IMF’s
refusal to continue support for Argentina in its darkest hour in December of 2001 is
illustrative of why the IMF alone cannot secure the entire sovereign debt system.85 The
IMF provides support for distressed sovereigns that behave according to its market-based
rules. However, many sovereigns do not abide by market-based standards for conduct and
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often their conduct has led them to the default in the first place. Thus, the IMF provides a
helpful form of investment protection, but only to a limited degree. Further, once default
has occurred, the IMF ceases to be useful as a source of investment recovery.
Likewise, the European Union’s economic and monetary integration has created a
similar mechanism within the Euro-zone. The recent Cyprus bailout has shown that deep
economic and monetary integration between nations can serve as an impetus for bailouts
by stronger economies. However, this arrangement has been far from successful. If
anything, the Cyprus debt debacle and future concerns about Greece, Italy, and Spain
have cast serious doubt on the long-term viability of the European Union. It seems
increasingly unlikely that countries like Germany will repeatedly agree to costly bailouts
to maintain the financial stability of its currency. There is also concern that deep
integration can lead to the moral hazard problem, where a sovereign undertakes
substantially more risk because at least some of the burden is spread among its
counterparties. Fiscally responsible countries derive little benefit from economic
integration when less-responsible countries are able to take advantage of their strong
economies and rely on them for bailouts.
E. Collective Action Clauses and Uniform Action Clauses
The mechanism that has seen the most widespread success is a private contractual
solution known as the Collective Action Clause (CAC). As noted above, the prevalence
and success of CAC’s have virtually eliminated the possibility of a Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism. Until recently, most sovereign bonds issued under New York
law required unanimity to restructure the entire class of debt (Uniform Action Clauses,
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UAC’s).86 UAC’s force sovereigns to either persuade the entire class of bonds or
negotiate restructuring efforts with each individual creditor. This standard exacerbated
the collective action problem and allowed holdouts to behave opportunistically. However,
bonds issued under the so called, “London Law” usually only required a supermajority of
bondholders to agree for the restructured plan to be binding on the entire class of debt
(CAC’s).87 CAC’s have become standard features of sovereign debt contracts over the
last decade.88 Since Mexico implemented a CAC in 2003, “virtually all” of new
sovereign debt contracts have included a CAC, and the inclusion of these provisions has
been dubbed the “Mexico Standard.”89 In theory, debt issued pursuant to this standard is
much easier to restructure, as obtaining the consent of a supermajority can bind the entire
class of debt and eliminate holdout creditors such as the NML Capital plaintiffs. While
the precise threshold varies by country and across bond issues, 90 the required threshold is
usually between 50% and 75%.91
A variation on a minimum voting threshold is for CAC’s to appoint a trustee to
negotiate on behalf of an entire class of debt. While formally distinct, this approach has
the same effect on the collective action problem. Putting the task of restructuring
decisions in the hands of a single actor (who is usually a member of the class and has
similar interests to the class) serves to coordinate the efforts of disaggregated, interested
parties.
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However, CAC’s do not solve the problem entirely. In order to be effective, a
sovereign must still be able to persuade the requisite threshold of debtors to agree to a
restructuring proposal. Especially when this threshold is upwards of 75%, that is no small
task. Perhaps most critically, the outcome of NML Capital could substantially handicap
the ability of sovereigns to persuade creditors not to holdout. The Second Circuit’s
decision to issue an injunction and effectively require Argentina to compensate to the
holdouts may have adversely altered the incentive structure and encouraged creditors to
holdout, rather than restructure. If so, sovereigns may have trouble executing future debt
restructuring efforts, even with CAC’s in effect.
In short, the international community has failed to produce a viable solution for
the sovereign debt conundrum. One argument against the IMF’s Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism was that actors have had recent “success stories” in
independent negotiations. This argument alleges that a supranational mechanism is not
necessary when actors can privately reach the same, effective resolution of disputes. In
response, Lee Buchheit appropriately characterized this “success” as “a bit like
concluding that World War I stands for the proposition that, left on their own, nationals
can work out their differences.92 While the last decade has shown that sovereign debt
restructurings are possible, few would call the recent efforts to restructure sovereign bond
obligations a success. Negotiations are marred by holdouts, ongoing collective action
problems, and an inability to enforce judicial awards against sovereigns. Thus, while the
international community of scholars, investors, and financial institutions have proposed
and discussed a number of solutions and remedies outlined above, none have proven
effective or practicable. The state of affairs has not been substantially changed by these
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proposals and mechanisms; sovereigns and investors are left to negotiate terms,
restructure debts, and resolve disputes subject only to national judicial remedies.
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PART V: JUDICIAL RESOLUTION ABSENT AN EXTERNAL MECHANISM
As noted above, sovereign debt presents substantial obstacles for debtors,
creditors, and courts. As the preceding section showed, the present legal environment has
failed to provide an immediate panacea. However, private remedies such as collective
action clauses have become prominent in most sovereign debt agreements. While these
clauses seem to alleviate the holdout problem for future debt restructurings, their
effectiveness remains uncertain. For reasons outlined below, the success of collective
action clauses will be entirely dependent upon the judicial resolution of the dispute
between NML Capital and Argentina and the subsequent behavior of the parties.
This section will first explain why the court’s decision in NML Capital is so
critical to the future of sovereign debt. After explaining that the NML case will set
precedential incentives for future debtors and creditors, the next subsection outlines the
outcome alternatives for the case and the incentives created by each. Finally, this section
concludes by making a normative argument that it is socially desirable for Argentina to
default on its current debt obligations.
A. Why the Judicial Outcome is Important
As noted in Part III, collective action clauses have become standard in sovereign
debt agreements. By empowering a majority of debt-holders to agree to a debt
restructuring on behalf of the entire class of debt, collective action clauses limit the
ability of holdouts and vulture creditors to impede the restructuring process. However,
the danger of holdout is not eliminated. There is always a chance that the requisite
number of creditors will not agree to the restructuring. This would result in either the
terms of the debt issuance remaining unchanged (no restructuring) or would result in the
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same state of affairs as is present in the Argentina debt instruments, where the collective
action clause is absent completely and the sovereign must obtain individual consent to
restructuring. Therefore, the ability of a class of debt to meet the minimum threshold set
by the collective action provision is of monumental importance to the clause’s
effectiveness.
This section will offer a model for examining how an individual will calculate a
decision to accept a debt restructure. That model will be used to explain how the outcome
of the NML Capital v. Argentina case could affect the decisions of future creditors to
agree to restructuring terms. Finally, that analysis will be applied to CAC’s to show that
the decisions following the NML Capital litigation have the ability to seriously handicap
CAC provisions in future debt contracts.
An individual debt holder’s decision to accept a restructuring agreement will
depend upon her perception of the likely opportunity cost to doing so. In this parlance,
the opportunity cost of restructuring is holding out. Stated differently, a holder of
sovereign debt faced with the option to restructure will make an assessment of her
expected utility under the terms of the restructure compared to her expected utility from
holding out (not restructuring). This decision can be illustrated by the following model:

In this model, the left side of the equation represents the expected value of holding out,
while the right side represents the expected value of restructuring. P1 is the probability of
receiving the full amount due under the original debt agreement (x). Initially, the model
assumes that the only two outcomes are (1) receiving the full amount due (x), or (2)

34

receiving zero payments (z). Thus, the probability of not being compensated for a
sovereign default at all is represented by 1-P1, because the two possibilities represent all
possible outcomes. On the right side of the equation, the value to the creditor under the
restructured debt agreement is represented by y, and the probabilities of being paid that
amount or not being paid at all (z) are represented by P2 and 1-P2, respectively. Assuming
that creditors are rational and behave in ways that maximize their expected utility, the
model suggests that when the creditor perceives her expected pay-off after restructuring
to be higher than holding out, she will choose to restructure. But when she perceives the
restructuring opportunity to be less desirable (lower utility) than her current agreement,
she will decline the proposed debt restructuring terms and opt to holdout.
It is important to note at this stage in the model that the term “perception” is a
very important adjective with respect to the expected values for holding out and
accepting the restructuring. Whether accurate or not, a creditors perception of her
expected payoff is completely determinate of her decision. Thus, an incorrect assumption
or a change in perceived likelihood of a particular outcome may disproportionately affect
her decision.
With the model as the baseline, it is possible to explain why the majority of the
creditors in the NML Capital case decided to accept the restructuring. Economic turmoil
and a failing Argentine economy support the assumption that the probability of being
paid in full pursuant to the original debt agreement was very low, if not zero (P1 =0).
Further, Argentina’s affirmative agreement not to pay the outside debt reinforced the
assumption that creditors holding the original debt agreements would not be paid. Thus, a
creditor would likely accept any offer to restructure that carried with it a greater certainty
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of payment. If we assume that the perceived probability of being paid under the
restructured debt agreement is .8 (there is still a chance Argentina will default on its new
debt agreements) and that the terms of the restructure are twenty-four cents on the dollar,
a creditor’s assessment of options may have looked like this:

Here, a creditor will accept an expected pay-off of less than twenty cents on the dollar (.8
x $0.24 = $0.19) to her original investment because the likelihood of being paid if she
does not restructure is zero. So if the expected value of the distribution under the original
debt agreements was zero, why do any creditors ever hold?
The holdouts in the NML Capital case (apparently with good reason) perceived
the chance of being paid through the original agreements as greater than zero. In the
example above, if they believed they had at least a twenty percent chance of receiving a
judicial award enforcing their original right to full payment, it would be in their best
interest to hold out. This ex ante assessment is where perception and the outcome of NML
Capital v. Argentina become critical. While many of the creditors perceived their chances
of recovery by holding out as virtually zero, the holdouts perceived it to be higher. After
the Second Circuit’s decision, it seems that the holdouts were correct, as the court is in
the process of upholding their rights under the original agreement. In this way, the courts
decision will substantially affect future debt holders’ cost-benefit analysis. If the decision
is upheld, the Second Circuit’s holding would clearly assert that the probability of being
compensated as a holdout is greater than zero.
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Thus, the NML Capital outcome is significant for three important reasons. First,
by upholding the rights of the hold out creditors, the court drastically affected the
probability that holdout creditors will be paid (P1) by asserting that they have judicially
enforceable rights when a sovereign makes payments to other debtors. Second, the
court’s decision will also affect the expected quantity that holdout creditors (x) and
creditors that agree to restructuring (y) can expect to receive. This second question, along
with the status of third party intermediaries, is the question that was remanded to the
District Court in the Second Circuit’s decision. Its precise outcome is still unknown.
Finally, the court’s decision may ultimately affect the probability that a sovereign will
make payments to restructured debt. The first effect (the increased rights of hold-out
creditors) is most important for the purposes of this paper. However, the second and third
reasons may also substantially affect the decision to restructure.
1. Upholding the rights of hold-out creditors (P1)
While the final status of the NML Capital v. Argentina outcome is still
undetermined, the Second Circuit’s decision confirmed the holding of the lower court and
upheld the rights of the holdout creditors to seek damages pursuant to the original debt
agreement. By upholding the pari passu clause and deciding that a sovereign debtor’s
payments to restructured debt without payments to the original debt was de facto
subordination, the court substantially affected the probabilities in the model above. Prior
to this decision, most creditors believed the probability of recovery for a holdout (P1) was
virtually zero. However, the Second Circuit has revealed that is no longer a prudent
assumption. Stated differently, creditors will now perceive their chances of recovering
when they hold out as substantially higher than zero. So while the probability of recovery
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if a creditor restructures is seemingly unaffected by the court’s decision,93 the probability
of recovering if a creditor does not accept has increased substantially. In the terms of the
model, P1 is now a non-zero, positive probability.
The obvious effect of this decision will be to increase the number of holdouts
when sovereigns try to restructure debt agreements. If a creditor believes she has a
substantial likelihood of recovery under the original terms, her incentive to restructure
falls relative to her incentive to holdout.
2. An unknown change to the quantity of recovery (x and y; P1=P2)
The issue of damage calculation was one of the issues that the Second Circuit
remanded to the district court. The Second Circuit asked the Judge Griesa to clarify the
formula by which the payments to the original debt should be calculated relative to the
payments made to the exchange debt. Judge Greisa explained that the amount Argentina
would be required to pay to the holdouts is calculated relative to the amount being paid to
the restructured debt. The “ratable payment” (x) due to the holdouts should be the
“payment percentage” multiplied by the amount due to the holdouts. The payment
percentage is calculated as the amount being paid to the exchange bonds divided by the
amount due to the exchange debt. Thus, x is calculated as follows:

It follows that in order to make full payments on the exchange debt, Argentina must fully
compensate the remaining amount due under the original debt. With respect to the model,
this decision inextricably links the amount paid to the original debt (x) and the amount
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This assertion is not necessarily true. As will be discussed later, upholding the rights of holdout creditors
may substantially affect the probability that restructured debt will recover. However, at this stage, it is
helpful to think of the two independently.
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paid to the restructured debt (y) and holds a constant proportion between the two. If this
calculation holds on appeal, it seems unlikely that a future creditor would ever willingly
restructure. If a sovereign must pay an equal percentage of what it owes to the original
debt and to the exchange debt, it would be against any actor’s interest to exchange an
entitlement to full compensation (x=1) for a fractional amount (y=.24) if the
probabilities of recovery are also equal(P1=P2). The Second Circuit’s opinion suggests
that these probabilities are also inextricably linked, as they held that payments could not
be made to exchange debt without making the aforementioned ratable payments to the
original debt. It is notable that this calculation is on appeal and has yet to be confirmed by
the second circuit. However, if Judge Griesa’s holding stands, this calculation, perhaps
even more so than the likelihood of payment absent exchange, will substantially decrease
a creditor’s incentive to restructure debt and increase her incentive to holdout.
3. A change to the probability of being paid if restructured (P2)
The final effect that the NML Capital decision will have is a decrease in the
probability of being paid the full amount promised under the terms of the debt
restructure. Prior to the decision, Argentina regularly made its payments pursuant to the
2005 and 2010 debt agreements. However, if the Republic wishes to continue to make
these payments in full, it will have to also fully pay the original holders of the debt. This
presents obvious problems, as Argentina did not have sufficient funds to pay the amount
owed to the original debt, which is why they restructured. While the gross amount they
will have to pay will be reduced by the percentage of creditors who accepted
restructuring, the amount owed to the holdouts is still upwards of $1.3 Billion. Since it is
unlikely that Argentina will be able to make full payments to both the holdout and the
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restructured debt, it is likely that the Republic will have to make a proportional payment
to both classes, marking a clear “win” for the holdouts and a clear loss for the
restructured debt.
As applied to the model above, the NML Capital decision (1) increased the
probability of hold-out payment (P1) to a non-zero, positive amount, (2) linked the
amount payable to holdout and restructured debt (x and y) to a constant proportion
(P1=P2), and (3) required the likelihood of payment to holdouts and restructured debt to
be equal to one another. Thus, the decision has altered the ex ante decision model as
follows:94

Taken together, these three outcomes suggest the judicial decision in NML
Capital will tend to incentivize more holdouts. In fact, the model seems to indicate that
no creditors will accept restructuring agreements, as now it is never in an actor’s best
interest to do so. The Second Circuit has required that the probability of payment for each
be equal, as well as the fractional payment to each class. Thus, the only difference
between the expected recovery for holdouts and restructured debt is the quantity
Argentina agrees to pay each class. Because the whole point of restructuring debt is to
alleviate a debtor’s burden, it would not make sense for the restructured terms to be
higher than the original.95 Therefore, when faced with the decision of whether to
restructure or holdout, a rational creditor will always holdout if the NML Capital changes
go into effect.
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Where “r” is a fractional amount reflective of the required “payment percentage.”
However, a debtor may be able to spread payments out and reduce its immediate financial burdens. If
time considerations are controlling, a restructured debt agreement may result in a higher gross amount paid
throughout the course of the debtor-creditor relationship, with the incremental payments shrinking.
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However, collective action clauses are intended to allow for a majority of
creditors to require the entire class of debt to restructure. Stated differently, they are
intended to alleviate the holdout problem. But with the incentive structure shown above,
creditors will have no reason to restructure in the first place. Here, the result would be
that no creditors restructure, which would render collective action clauses useless.
B. Why Argentina’s Response is Important
As noted in the preceding section, the judicial outcome of NML Capital, seems to
meet one of the two main criteria set forth in Section III. To its credit, the current judicial
resolution upholds the backbone of good-faith negotiations by enforcing the rights of
holdout creditors. By upholding those rights in such a strong way, the court effectively
reinforced the notion of “bargaining in the shadow of the law.” However, while
protecting the rights of creditors, the judicial outcome also substantially decreased the
incentive to restructure when it is socially optimal to do so. When a sovereign is in a “bad
state” and is unable to pay its full debt obligations, it is in the best interest of all parties
involved for the creditors to cooperate and consent to a restructuring agreement. If a
sovereign and its creditors are not able to successfully undertake a debt restructuring, it is
likely that none of the creditors will recover, and the sovereign will simply be unable to
make any payments. While the recent addition of collective action clauses to sovereign
debt agreements is meant to alleviate that problem, the model outlined above suggests
that the judicial decision will undermine the effectiveness of collective action clauses in
creating a coordination tool.
However, the judicial response is only half of the equation. Because of
Argentina’s unique role as a sovereign, the judicial remedy in the NML Capital case was
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limited to an injunction. Through its ability to control third parties, the Second Circuit
was able to prohibit Argentina from paying the exchange debt without also paying the
holdouts. The court was unable to force Argentina to pay the amount owed on the
original bonds. Thus, Argentina still has a fair amount of autonomy with respect to its
response to the judicial decision. This section will argue that while it may seem
counterintuitive, the socially optimal response (i.e., the response that yields the greatest
total social utility) to the judicial outcome is for Argentina to default (or completely
repudiate) and not make payments to either class of debt. However, the socially optimal
response is not the optimal response for Argentina. Because Argentina is a repeat player
in the international debt market, it is likely that the sovereign will comply with the
Second Circuit’s decision to the greatest extent possible in order to ensure that it can
obtain relatively low-cost financing in the future.
1. An Argentine default as the socially optimal response to NML capital
As stated in Section III, the goals of a sovereign debt regime should be to
maintain creditors’ rights sufficient to garner good-faith efforts by the sovereign and to
incentivize “efficient restructuring” (i.e. restructuring when a sovereign is in a “bad
state”). However, the model presented above shows that the NML Capital decision, if
upheld, presents a serious risk of disincentivizing any restructuring possibility. Yet,
Argentina may substantially affect future creditors’ decision calculus depending on its
response. If the Second Circuit’s injunction is upheld, Argentina seems to have three
possible responses. First, it could attempt to continue to make full payments to the
exchange debt and pay the original debt (the holdouts) in full. Second, the sovereign may
decide not to make full payments, but rather make pro rata payments to each class.
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Alternatively, the Argentine Republic could elect not to make payments to either class of
debt. While this last option is not optimal for the short run interests of current creditors, it
is the long-term best response for the stability of the sovereign debt system.
a. Payment in Full and Pro Rata Payments to both classes
By paying both classes of debt in full, Argentina would reinforce the incentives to
hold out as outlined by the model above. Under this scenario, both the holdouts and the
exchange debt would receive the full compensation that they agreed upon. However, this
course would mark a clear victory for holdouts. If Argentina pays the holdouts in full,
holders of the exchange bonds will know they essentially forfeited seventy-five percent
of their legal entitlements. As noted, this undermines the effectiveness of collective
action clauses. After seeing the holdouts recover in full, no future investors will willingly
forfeit her legal right to full payment for a restructured amount.96 So even with the
minimum threshold collective action clauses create, it seems unlikely that any creditor
will elect to restructure, let alone the requisite majority necessary for the collective action
clause to be effective.
The same problem is true if Argentina makes pro rata payments pursuant to the
Second Circuit’s injunction. In this scenario, the holdouts would recover the same
proportion of their original entitlement (a higher amount) as the exchange holders (a
substantially lower amount). Again, future creditors have no incentive in this scenario to
agree to a debt exchange or restructuring. If they know that they will ultimately be paid
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However, for this scenario to come to pass, the exchange debt still plays an important role. Without the
exchange, Argentina’s total debt would be so insurmountable that payment in full would not be an option.
The restricting of 2005 and 2010 lowered Argentina’s obligations with respect to 90% of its creditors. If
not for those restructurings, payment in full would not be an option. This shows a circular problem: when
none of the creditors restructure, none of the creditors will be able to recover. This problem is addressed
below.

43

only a fraction of what they are owed, creditors will obviously choose the fraction of the
larger amount (the original bonds) over the smaller amount (the exchange bonds). Again,
every rational creditor will choose the maintain her original entitlements and none will
restructure.
The difference between these two alternatives is really whether Argentina is able
to increase the total amount it pays to creditors or whether the Republic has a fixed
amount which it will be able to allocate to servicing its debt. The first scenario could lead
to the first alternative in which both classes are paid in full. The second alternative where
Argentina will pay a fixed amount and allocate that amount between the two classes of
debt is more likely. If Argentina could substantially vary the total amount it pays to
creditors (either through increased tax revenues or altered domestic spending habits), it
probably would not have needed to restructure in the first place. However, the sovereign
is bound by what it is able to collect in tax revenues, making this ability relatively
unlikely. Instead, it is probable that Argentina knows that it can make a fixed amount of
total payments to service all of its debt. Under this scenario, the decision to accept the
exchange offer or continue with the holdout only affects the relative allocation of funds
to the creditors. But the effect is the same for both scenarios. In both cases, it is in the
creditors’ best interest to hold out to gain a larger proportion of whatever sum is
distributed.97
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Notably, under the scenario where Argentina will distribute a fixed amount among exchange and holdout
creditors, if every creditor holds out, the effect will be identical to every party restructuring. For example,
if Argentina’s original debt obligations are $10 Billion, but the sovereign is only able to make payments in
total of $2 Billion, Argentina will attempt to restructure to reflect their ability to pay. Their offer will
probably be approximately $0.20 on each dollar owed. If every party agrees to the exchange, each creditor
will receive 20% of his original entitlement. However, if no parties restructure, Argentina’s obligations are
still $10 Billion, but it is only able to pay 20% of that obligation. Again, each creditor recovers 20% of her
original obligation. In this example, it does not matter whether the parties all restructure or all hold out,
their recovery amount will be the same. However, the point is that when parties will choose between
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b. The Effect of a Complete Argentine Default (or “repudiation” of debt)
Despite the incentives created by the Second Circuit, Argentina is in an incredibly
influential position to increase stability in the sovereign debt market. They could do so
by completely defaulting on both classes of debt and not making payments to either class.
While this will result in short term losses for all of its creditors, a default will send a clear
message to future creditors.
As noted above, the problematic effect of the Second Circuit’s decision is the
reality that if any amount is distributed to Argentina’s original and exchange debt, the
holdouts are the clear winners, as they recover a higher portion of the original entitlement
at the expense of the exchange debt. However, the scenario plays out quite differently
when no creditors recover. If Argentina chooses or is unable to pay any of its debt
obligations as a result of the Second Circuit’s injunction, future creditors will once again
have an incentive to agree to restructuring offers. Argentina’s refusal to pay would
reinstate the real possibility that, under a certain set of circumstances where creditors
holdout, some creditors would lose the entirety of their investment. If creditors perceive a
very real possibility that widespread holdouts will result in complete default by the
sovereign, they will once again have an incentive to restructure in good faith when a
country is in a “bad state.” In the case where each class of debt is paid an equal pro rata

restructuring and holding out, none will willingly restructure. In a scenario when 90% of the creditors
restructure and 10% hold out, the allocation of the $2 Billion at stake will play out as follows:

So Argentina will be able to make payments to each class of debt representing 17.8% of its obligation to
each. However, since the holdouts are still entitled to their original $10 Million, they receive a higher
proportion of their original entitlement (17.8%) whereas the restructured debt only receives 17.8% of their
20% entitlement under the restructure, or 3.57% of the original agreement.
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share, as prescribed by the Second Circuit, that consideration is completely absent,
leading to an outcome where every creditor chooses to holdout.
However, while an Argentine repudiation of debts may encourage many of the
creditors to accept future offers to restructure, it still leaves open the possibility that a
small percentage of creditors may try to “shirk” and attempt to recover substantial
payoffs pursuant to the Second Circuit’s decision. Essentially, it returns the state of
affairs to the present case prior to the NML Capital decision. This consideration is why
collective action clauses may once again be relevant if Argentina decides not to make
payments to either class. After the NML Capital decision, future creditors need an
impetus to shift their optimal decision from holding out to accepting a restructure. A
complete default or repudiation by Argentina would serve that purpose; collective action
clauses will not be undermined if most creditors regain the incentive to restructure when
it is efficient to do so. So although a few creditors may want to behave opportunistically
to recover a higher portion than their peers, collective action clauses will solve that
problem for future contracts as they were intended to do. Therefore, while an offer to
restructure may not persuade every creditor to accept the exchange, the offer need only
persuade the requisite threshold specified by the collective action clause in order to be
effective. Thus, while the short-term consequences of a refusal to pay are not desirable
and may even constitute a bad faith effort by Argentina, such a repudiation would
counteract NML Capital v. Argentina’s debilitating effect on collective action clauses and
the strong incentives to holdout it created. Therefore, a complete default is precisely the
response that will yield the socially optimal response for future sovereign debt
agreements.
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2. Argentina’s individual incentives do not align with the socially optimal outcome
Until this point, this analysis has not examined the problem from the perspective
of Argentina as a rational, self-interested debtor. While an Argentine default may
promote long-term efficiency from a social perspective, Argentina’s individual interests
suggest that it will not repudiate its debt obligations.
As a sovereign actor, foreign courts cannot force Argentina to make payments on
its debts with assets located outside the foreign court’s jurisdiction. In certain
circumstances, foreign courts may be able to seize Argentine assets98 being used for
commercial purposes and liquidate them to satisfy Argentina’s creditors.99 However,
short of those extreme circumstances, Argentina is under no legally enforceable
obligation to repay its debt. Any choice to do so must stem from extra-legal motivations.
Argentina and its lawyers in the Southern District of New York and the Second
Circuit have threatened to withhold payment to the holdouts.100 If the Republic’s threat
holds true, the threat would have the effect of withholding payment from all debt holders,
as the court ordered injunction would render third-party banks incapable of paying the
exchange bondholders absent payment to holdouts. While these threats were probably
made to elicit a favorable ruling in the NML Capital litigation and have only a short-term
perspective, the arguments made above suggest that Argentina’s threatened response is
critical for maintaining a well-functioning sovereign debt system.
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One of the more controversial parts of the Second Circuit’s decision was a liberal grant for discovery
proceedings which purport to allow NML Capital to identify all Argentinian assets around the globe. The
Supreme Court has accepted Argentina’s petition for certiorari to, which argues that this broad grant
violates the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and asks the court to overturn the discovery grant.
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28 U.S.C.A. § 1610.
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Peter Eavis, Argentina’s Bond Case is Being Closely Watched for Ramifications, NY TIMES DEALBOOK
(February 27, 2013), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/argentinas-bond-case-is-beingclosely-watched-for-ramifications/.
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There is a vast body of economic literature that seeks to answer the question:
“why do sovereigns repay their debts?” The answer to this question will reveal
Argentina’s individual considerations and may suggest whether it will repudiate its debt
obligations. Many have argued that there is a strong reputational component to sovereign
lending, and sovereigns choose to pay their creditors because doing so will maintain
future lines of credit at lower interest rates.101
The logic behind this conventional approach to the risk-reward relationship is
simple. When a sovereign defaults, bondholders are economically harmed and will be
less likely to lend to the same sovereign in the future. While the precise relationship
between a sovereign default and the risk premium associated with future bonds is
difficult to predict ex ante102, some have successfully calculated the risk premium ex post.
Of notable significance for the case at hand, Kris Mitchener and Marc Weidenmier
estimated the increased risk premium on Argentinian debt following a prior default
during the Baring Crisis of 1890.103 Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, much like the
1990s, capital flowed into Argentina at unprecedented rates, and lending to the South
American country accounted for a substantial portion of international lending.104 When
Argentina ultimately defaulted on approximately £48 Million, Mitchener and
Weidenmier estimate that the market premium on Argentinian bonds increased by 840
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Herschel Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default,
Repudiation, and Reputation, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1673, 1985).
102
Aguiar et al., supra note 68, at 82.
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Kris Mitchener & Marc Weidenmier, The Baring Crisis and the Great Latin American Meltdown of the
1890s, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13404, 2007).
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Id. at 3-4. ("As a result of the open capital markets that prevailed in the nineteenth century, Argentina
was able to borrow extensively abroad. It was the fifth largest sovereign borrower in the world. It absorbed
roughly 11 percent of all ne issues in the new London market between 1884 and 1890 and 40 to 50 percent
of all lending that occurred outside the United Kingdom in 1888… Taylor suggests that ‘the 188s stand out
as a period of totally unprecedented capital inflows into an emerging market at any time in history.’ The
current account deficit, as a percentage of GDP, averaged 20 percent from 1884 to 1889.”)
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basis points in the year following the default and by more than 1,600 basis points in the
five years following the default.105 Essentially, these authors’ research quantified the
increase in the risk premium on Argentinian bonds following the country’s default, even
in a 19th century market that was far less sophisticated than today’s. Other authors have
shown similar negative effects on defaulting sovereigns. Sule Ozler showed a
corresponding increase in risk premia for defaulting countries in the context of private
lending agreements and estimated that a sovereign’s default history accounted for
between 11 and 50 percent of the risk premia private lenders charged to developing
countries.106 Eaton and Gersovitz argue that private lenders create maximum credit limits,
or “credit ceilings” for defaulting sovereigns, which represent the maximum amount that
the private lender will be willing to lend the sovereign in the future.107 Although the
private lending context is distinguishable from public bond markets, a sovereign’s default
should have similar negative repercussions for the public sector in both financing
arrangements. Furthermore, Şenay Ağca and Oya Celasun show that the negative effects
of sovereign default are not limited to the public sector. In their 2012 study, the authors
identify a positive correlation between sovereign default risk and lending interest rates to
corporate entities.108 Ağca and Celasun suggest that a sovereign default increases the risk
that a corporate entity will face higher tax burdens in the future, and therefore lenders and
bond purchasers attribute a higher risk premium to corporations whose sovereign has
defaulted.
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Thus, it seems likely that the need for future financing, whether through the bond
market or through private lending, will compel Argentina to honor the obligations that it
owes to its creditors in line with the Second Circuit’s holding. Argentina’s refusal to pay
its current debt obligations would result in higher rates of interest in the future and
perhaps unwillingness by future lenders to purchase Argentine bonds. Some have
criticized this view as over-simplified,109 and have suggested that lenders must be able to
threaten trade sanctions or other adverse effects to international trade in order to persuade
a sovereign to honor its debt commitments.110 However, even those authors do not
completely discredit the reputational effects of a sovereign default on future credit
terms.111
As is evident from Argentina’s long history with sovereign defaults, Argentina is
a repeat player in the international bond market and will necessarily need to obtain
financing in the future. Thus, conventional logic seems to indicate that it is probable
Argentina will attempt to make some good faith payments to its exchange bondholders
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and likewise have to make pro rata payments to the holdouts. However, there is an
alternative “altruism” consideration that may suggest that Argentina will not act as a
rational, self-interested actor and instead will default on its obligations, despite the
negative reputational benefits of such a default, in order to bestow positive effects on the
sovereign bond market. Paul Rubin suggests this idea in the context of public goods.112
In order for this altruistic approach to be a possibility, Argentina must (a) recognize the
greater social utility of its default, (b) convince others that its motivations are altruistic
and not opportunistic, and (c) be willing to bear the individual economic repercussions of
such default discussed above. Even if Argentina could recognize the social benefit of a
default on the economic system (a) and convince others of its good intentions (b), it is
unlikely that Argentina could afford to act altruistically (c) given its current economic
state. As discussed above, a default would impede Argentina’s ability to borrow in the
future, a consideration that would almost certainly outweigh any incentive to behave
altruistically. Therefore, while an Argentine default would likely remedy the Second
Circuit’s decision and achieve stability in the sovereign bond market, it is unlikely that
Argentina will take that course of action because it simply cannot afford to do so.
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PART VI: CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, the market for sovereign debt has played out like a crimethriller novel. Each subsequent development has added layers of complexity and has
“changed the game” in some regard. The storyline has been set by foundational
complications of sovereign debt. Subsequent discussions of an IMF sponsored Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanism contributed to one chapter in the story, but the plot was
quickly complicated by the widespread implementation of collective action clauses in
2003. Now, it seems as though another chapter is beginning. If the NML Capital case is
upheld and Argentina is forced to pay its holdout creditors, the decision reached by the
Second Circuit will render Collective Action Clauses nearly useless. Under those facts, it
will never be in a creditor’s best interest to restructure debt holdings, as both holdouts
and creditors will be paid in equal proportion to one another. However, after the judicial
resolution of the lawsuit, Argentina has an opportunity to add yet another chapter.
At this point in time, it is impossible to know whether Argentina’s short-term
perspective will cede to a more strategic, long-term approach to financing. If so, one
would guess Argentina will not follow-through on its threat to repudiate its debt and will
at least partially pay its creditors. However, based on the model, analysis, and arguments
made above, investors should cross their fingers that Argentina is shortsighted. While
Argentina’s threatened course of action (complete repudiation) will render the sovereign
unable to secure favorable financing in the future and will leave holders of the 2005 and
2010 Argentine exchange bonds much worse off, these short term losses would benefit
future holders of bonds and afford the rest of society a much more stable system for
international sovereign debt.
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However, recent petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
may take the ultimate decision out of Argentina’s hands and place it squarely in the hands
of the United States judiciary. Currently, two petitions for certiorari have been submitted
to the Supreme Court. The first petition, which the Supreme Court has already accepted,
asks the court to overrule the Second Circuit’s decision with respect to discovery of
Argentinian assets abroad. This portion of the decision deals with the judicial
enforcement of the court’s holding. The second petition, which has been submitted to the
court but not yet accepted, asks the court to overturn the Second Circuit’s holding that the
pari passu clause gives holdout bond holders full rights to payment relative to holders of
restructured bonds. I will briefly analyze how these two petitions could affect the
outcome of the Second Circuit’s NML Capital decision.
The second petition, which addresses the policy question at the heart of the NML
Capital holding, is somewhat easier to resolve. While the Second Circuit’s holding is
problematic in that it creates an incentive for future bondholders to refuse a restructuring
when it is efficient to do so, the alternative holding would be equally problematic. If the
Second Circuit would have held that the holdout creditors do not have equal rights to the
restructured debt, the court would have severely handicapped future negotiations by
limiting the judicial rights of holdout creditors. Stated differently, so long as holdout
creditors have legally enforceable rights, both parties have an incentive to negotiate in
good faith. This idea has been referred to as “bargaining in the shadow of the law,”
throughout this paper. A contrary holding by the Second Circuit would eliminate the legal
backbone that promotes efficient negotiation. Therefore, if the Supreme Court overturned
the Second Circuit’s decision on the merits, the sovereign bond market would no longer
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have a problem with opportunistic holdout creditors, but it would begin to have a
problem with opportunistic sovereigns. Under a regime where holdouts do not have
legally enforceable rights, a sovereign could act opportunistically and restructure
whenever it desired to do so. Bondholders would be forced to restructure, as refusing to
do so would result in complete non-payment of the sovereigns outstanding obligations.
Therefore, if the Supreme Court chooses to accept the petition for certiorari based on the
rights of the holdout creditors, the main holding of the Second Circuit should be upheld.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court could deny the certiorari petition and implicitly uphold
the Second Circuit’s decision.
A more interesting possibility is that the Supreme Court could use the petition for
certiorari related to enforceability and discovery as a way to uphold the rights of holdout
creditors but to strip the Second Circuit’s judgment of its teeth. Stated differently, the
Supreme Court may uphold the intent of the Second Circuit’s holding by affirming the
rights of holdout creditors, but it would limit judgments in the holdouts’ favor by
disallowing discovery proceedings to identify sovereign assets within the reach of US
court attachment. This second possibility would return the sovereign bond market to a
similar state as before the Second Circuit issued the NML Capital decision. Blocking the
discovery efforts of holdout creditors seeking to attach sovereign assets would markedly
reduce the incentive to hold out in the wake of a sovereign debt restructuring and would
substantially diminish the possibility of recovery.
As this paper has argued, an Argentinian repudiation of debt is the optimal
outcome to the Second Circuit’s decision. However, because it is unlikely that Argentina
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will choose to repudiate its entire debt obligations, the best opportunity for stability in the
sovereign bond market seems to lie in the hands of the Supreme Court.
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